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The Value of Relationships: 
Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports†
By Rocco Macchiavello and Ameet Morjaria*
This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation in the 
context of the Kenyan rose export sector. A model of reputation and 
relational contracting is developed and tested. A seller’s reputation 
is defined by buyer’s beliefs about seller’s reliability. We show that (i) 
due to lack of enforcement, the volume of trade is constrained by the 
value of the relationship; (ii) the value of the relationship increases 
with the age of the relationship; and (iii) during an exogenous neg-
ative supply shock deliveries are an inverted-U shaped function of 
relationship’s age. Models exclusively focusing on enforcement or 
insurance considerations cannot account for the evidence. (JEL 
D86, F14, L14, O13, O19, Q17)
Imperfect contract enforcement is a pervasive feature of real-life commercial 
transactions. In the absence of formal contract enforcement, trading parties rely 
on informal mechanisms to guarantee contractual performance (e.g., Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff 2002; Greif 2005; Fafchamps 2010). Among those mech-
anisms, long-term relationships based on trust or reputation are perhaps the most 
widely studied and have received substantial theoretical attention. The theoretical 
literature has developed a variety of models that capture salient features of real-life 
relationships, e.g., enforcement problems (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; 
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1994; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Levin 
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2003), insurance considerations (e.g., Thomas and Worrall 1988), or uncertainty 
over  parties commitment to the relationship (e.g., Ghosh and Ray 1996; Watson 
1999; Halac 2012). While these different models share the common insight that 
future rents are necessary to deter short-term opportunism, they also differ in import-
ant aspects. Empirical evidence on informal relationships between firms, therefore, 
has the potential to identify which frictions are most salient in a particular context. 
In turn, such knowledge can be beneficial for policy, particularly in a development 
context. Empirical progress in the area, however, has been limited by the paucity of 
data on transactions between firms in environments with limited or no formal con-
tract enforcement and challenges in measuring future rents and beliefs.
This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation, intended as beliefs 
buyers hold about seller’s reliability, in the context of the Kenyan rose export sec-
tor. A survey we conducted among exporters in Kenya reveals that relationships 
with foreign buyers are not governed by written contracts enforceable in courts. The 
perishable nature of roses makes it impractical to write and enforce contracts on 
supplier’s reliability. Upon receiving the roses, the buyer could refuse payment and 
claim that the roses did not arrive in the appropriate condition while the seller could 
always claim otherwise. The resulting contractual imperfections, exacerbated by the 
international nature of the transaction, imply that firms rely on repeated transactions 
to assure contractual performance.
The analysis takes advantage of three features of this setting. First, unlike domes-
tic sales, all export sales are administratively recorded by customs. We use four 
years of transaction-level data of all exports of roses from Kenya, including the 
names of domestic sellers and foreign buyers, as well as information on units traded, 
prices, and transaction date. Second, in the flower industry, direct supply relation-
ships coexist alongside a well-functioning spot market, the Dutch auctions.1 If roses 
transacted in the relationships can be traded on the auctions, incentive compatibility 
considerations imply that the spot market price can be used to compute a lower 
bound to the future value of the relationship. Third, a negative supply shock pro-
vides a unique opportunity to test the predictions of the reputation model and distin-
guish it from alternative models. Following heavily contested presidential elections 
in Kenya at the end of December 2007, several, but not all, regions of the country 
plunged into intense episodes of ethnic violence in January 2008. Flower exporters 
located in some regions suddenly found themselves lacking significant proportions 
of their labor force and suffered a dramatic drop in exports. We examine how export-
ers reacted to the violence and which relationships they prioritized.
We first present a model of the relationship between a rose producer (seller) and 
a foreign buyer (buyer). The setup of the model matches qualitative features of the 
market under consideration. The model is analyzed under three scenarios: (i) the 
benchmark case with no contract enforcement; (ii) an extension with uncertainty 
over the seller’s type; and, finally, (iii) an extension to examine the seller’s reac-
tion to the violence. The three different scenarios are used to explicitly derive three 
1 The “Dutch”, or “clock”, auction is named after the flower auctions in the Netherlands. In a Dutch auction the 
auctioneer begins with a high asking price which is lowered until some participant is willing to accept, and pay, 
the auctioneer’s price. This type of auction is convenient when it is important to auction goods timely, since a sale 
never requires more than one bid. 
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empirical tests. The version of the model with no contract enforcement, developed 
along the lines of the relational contracts literature, is analyzed first. The incentive 
compatibility constraints of the model clarify how information on quantities trans-
acted, prices in the relationships, and auction prices, which are all observable in 
the data, can be used to compute lower bounds to the value of the relationship for 
the buyer and the seller. The model also yields a simple test to establish whether 
the volume of trade in the relationship is limited by lack of contractual enforce-
ment. The model is then extended to consider uncertainty over the seller’s type and 
to examine how reputational forces influence the seller’s reaction to the negative 
shock induced by the violence. Consistent with the interviews in the field, we model 
the violence as an unanticipated and observable shock that makes it impossible to 
deliver roses unless the seller undertakes additional costly and unobservable effort 
(e.g., hire extra security, set up camps to host workers menaced by the violence). 
The model predicts an inverted-U shaped relationship between deliveries at the time 
of the violence and age of the relationship. Over time, the seller establishes a reputa-
tion for reliability. The relationship becomes more valuable and incentives to deliver 
during the violence to protect the valuable reputation increase with the age of the 
relationship. In sufficiently old relationships, however, a seller’s reliability has been 
proven and deliveries at the time of the violence do not convey further information 
about future reliability.
When this is the case, incentives to protect the reputation and deliver during the 
violence vanish. We then test the predictions of the model. Measures of the value of 
the future rents in the relationship for the buyers and the sellers are computed. First, 
we find evidence consistent with incentive considerations limiting the volume of trade. 
Second, the estimated relationship values positively correlate with the age and past 
amount of trade in the relationship. The results, which hold controlling for relationship 
(which include seller, buyer, and cohort), time, and selection effects, are inconsistent 
with the pure limited enforcement version of the model but support the version with 
uncertainty over seller’s type. At the time of the violence, exporters located in the 
region directly affected by the violence could not satisfy commitments with all buyers. 
The violence was a large shock and exporters had to chose which buyers to prioritize. 
We document an inverted-U shaped relationship between deliveries at the time of the 
violence and age of the relationship. We also provide direct evidence that firms located 
in the conflict region exerted costly effort to protect their relationships with foreign 
buyers. The evidence is consistent with the reputation model and is not consistent with 
other models, e.g., those that exclusively focus on enforcement or insurance consid-
erations. We discuss the policy implications of these findings, particularly from the 
point of view of export promotion in developing countries, in the concluding section.
The findings and methodology of the paper contribute to the empirical litera-
ture on relationships between firms. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Banerjee 
and Duflo (2000) are closely related contributions that share with the current paper 
a developing country setting.2 In an environment characterized by the absence of 
2 Banerjee and Munshi (2004); Andrabi, Ghatak, and Khwaja (2006); and Munshi (2011) provide interesting 
studies of contractual relationships in a development context, but with a rather different focus. For example, Munshi 
(2011) and Banerjee and Munshi (2004) provide evidence on the trade enhancing role of long-term relationships 
based on community ties. Andrabi, Ghatak, and Khwaja (2006) provide evidence of how flexible specialization 
attenuates hold-up problems. Hjort (2014) studies how ethnic divisions impact productivity using data from a 
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 formal contract enforcement, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) find evidence con-
sistent with long-term informal relationships facilitating trade credit. Banerjee and 
Duflo (2000) infer the importance of reputation by showing that a firm’s age strongly 
correlates with contractual forms in the Indian software industry. Both McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999) and Banerjee and Duflo (2000) rely on cross-sectional sur-
vey evidence and cannot control for unobserved firm, or client, heterogeneity. In 
contrast, we exploit an exogenous supply shock and rely on within buyer-seller 
relationships evidence to prove the existence, study the source, and quantify the 
importance of the future rents necessary to enforce the implicit contract. Antras and 
Foley (forthcoming) and Macchiavello (2010) are two closely related studies in 
an export context. Antras and Foley (forthcoming) study the use of prepayment to 
attenuate the risk of default by the importer. Using data from a US based exporter 
of frozen and refrigerated food products they find that prepayment is more com-
mon at the beginning of a relationship and with importers located in countries with 
a weaker institutional environment. Macchiavello (2010), instead, focuses on the 
implications of learning about new suppliers in the context of Chilean wine exports. 
In the context of domestic markets, particularly for credit and agricultural products, 
Fafchamps (2000, 2004, 2010) has documented the importance of informal relation-
ships between firms in Africa and elsewhere.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the industry, its 
contractual practices, and the ethnic violence. Section II introduces the model and 
derives testable predictions. Section III presents the empirical results. Section IV 
provides a discussion of the findings. Section V offers some concluding remarks and 
policy implications. Proofs, additional results, and further information on the data 
are available in the online Appendices.
I. Background
This section provides background information on the industry, its contractual 
practices, and the ethnic violence. The section relies on information collected 
through a representative survey of the Kenyan flower industry conducted by the 
authors through face-to-face interviews in the summer of 2008.
A. The Kenyan Flower Industry
Over the last decade, Kenya has become one of the largest exporters of flowers 
in the world. The flower industry, one of the largest foreign-currency earners for 
the Kenyan economy, counts around 100 established exporters located at various 
clusters in the country. Roses, the focus of this study, account for about 80 percent 
of exports of cut flowers from Kenya. Roses are fragile and perishable. To ensure 
Kenyan flower plant. The literature on tied labor in rural contexts has studied the connections existing between spot 
markets and informal relationships (see, e.g., Bardhan 1983 and Mukherjee and Ray 1995). 
3 Alongside a larger literature that studies formal contracts between firms (see Lafontaine and Slade 2012 for 
a survey), some studies have focused on the relationship between informal enforcement mechanisms and formal 
contract choice (see, e.g., Corts and Singh 2004; Kalnins and Mayer 2004; Lyons 2002; Gil and Marion 2013). With 
the exception of Gil and Marion (2013), these papers also rely on cross-sectional data and proxy the rents available 
in the relationship with product, firm, or market characteristics that might affect contractual outcomes in other ways. 
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the supply of high-quality roses to distant markets, coordination along the supply 
chain is crucial. Roses are hand-picked in the field, kept in cool storage rooms at a 
constant temperature for grading, then packed, transported to Nairobi’s international 
airport in refrigerated trucks owned by firms, inspected, and sent to overseas mar-
kets. The industry is labor intensive and employs mostly low educated women in 
rural areas. Workers receive training in harvesting, handling, grading, packing and 
acquire skills which are difficult to replace in the short-run. Because of both demand 
(e.g., particular events in the year such as Valentine’s Day and Mother’s Day) and 
supply factors (it is costly to produce roses in Europe during winter), floriculture is 
a seasonal business. The business season begins in mid-August.
B. Contractual Practices
Roses are exported in two ways: they can be sold in the Netherlands at the Dutch 
auctions or can be sold to direct buyers. Direct buyers are located in the Netherlands 
and elsewhere (including Western Europe, Russia, the United States, Japan, and the 
Middle East). The two marketing channels share the same logistic operations asso-
ciated with exports, but differ with respect to their contractual structure. The Dutch 
auctions are close to the idealized Walrasian market described in textbooks. There 
are no contractual obligations to deliver particular volumes or qualities of flowers 
at any particular date. Upon arrival in the Netherlands, a clearing agent transports 
the flowers to the auctions where they are inspected, graded, and finally put on 
the auction clock. Buyers bid for the roses accordingly to the protocol of a stan-
dard descending price Dutch auction. The corresponding payment is immediately 
transferred from the buyer’s account to the auction houses and then to the exporter, 
after deduction of a commission for the auctions and the clearing agent. Apart from 
consolidating demand and supply of roses in the market, the Dutch auctions act as a 
platform and provide a mechanism to enforce contracts between buyers and sellers 
located in different countries. The auctions certify the quality of the roses sold and 
enforce payments from buyers to sellers. It is common practice in the industry to 
keep open accounts at the auction houses even for those firms that sell their produc-
tion almost exclusively through direct relationships. The costs of maintaining an 
account are small, while the option value can be substantial.
Formal contract enforcement, in contrast, is missing in the direct relationships 
between the flower exporter and the foreign buyer, typically a wholesaler. The export 
nature of the transaction and the high perishability of roses makes it impossible to 
write and enforce contracts on supplier’s reliability. Upon receiving the roses, the 
buyer could refuse payment and claim that the roses sent were not of the appropriate 
variety and/or did not arrive in good condition. The seller could always claim other-
wise. Accordingly, exporters do not write complete contracts with foreign buyers.4
Exporters and foreign buyers negotiate a marketing plan at the beginning of the 
season. With respect to volumes, the parties typically agree on some minimum 
4 Among the surveyed 74 producers, only 32 had a written contract with their main buyer. When a contract is 
written, it is highly incomplete. Among the 32 firms with a written contract, less than a third had any written pro-
vision on the volumes, quality, and schedule at which flowers have to be delivered. Written contracts often include 
clauses for automatic renewal. A handful of firms report to have had a written contract only in the first year of their 
relationship with a particular buyer. 
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 volume of orders year round to guarantee the seller a certain level of sales. Parties 
might, however, agree to allow for a relatively large percentage (e.g., 20 percent) of 
orders to be managed “ad hoc.” With respect to prices, most firms negotiate constant 
prices with their main buyer throughout the year but some have prices changing 
twice a year, possibly through a catalogue or price list. Prices are not indexed on 
quality nor on prices prevailing at the Dutch auctions.
Contracts do not specify exclusivity clauses. In particular, contracts do not require 
firms to sell all, or even a particular share, of their production to a buyer or to not 
sell on the spot market. In principle, it would seem possible to write enforceable 
contracts that prevent firms from side-selling roses at the auctions. The ability to sell 
on the spot market, however, gives producers flexibility to sell excess production as 
well as protection against buyers defaults and opportunism. Such contractual provi-
sions might not be desirable.
This paper takes the existence of direct relationships as given and does not 
explain why relationships coexist along-side a spot-market.5 Beside lower freight 
and time costs, a well-functioning relationship provides buyers and sellers with sta-
bility. Buyers’ commitment to purchase pre-specified quantities of roses throughout 
the season allows sellers to better plan production. Buyers value reliability in supply 
of roses often sourced from different regions to be combined into bouquets. Parties 
trade off these benefits with the costs of managing and nurturing direct relationships 
in an environment lacking contract enforcement.
C. Electoral Violence
An intense episode of ethnic violence affected several parts of Kenya following 
contested presidential elections at the end of December 2007. The ethnic violence 
had two major spikes lasting for a few days at the beginning and at the end of 
January 2008. The regions in which rose producers are clustered were not all equally 
affected. Only firms located in the Rift Valley and in the Western Provinces were 
directly affected by the violence (see online Appendix C, Figure A1).6 The main 
consequence of the violence was that firms located in the regions affected by the 
violence found themselves lacking a significant number of their workers. Among 
the 74 firms surveyed, 42 were located in regions that were directly affected by the 
violence. Online Appendix D, Table A1 shows that while firms located in regions 
not affected by the violence did not report any significant absence among workers 
(1 percent, on average), firms located in regions affected by the violence reported an 
average of 50 percent of their labor force missing during the period of the violence. 
Furthermore, firms were unable to completely replace workers. On average, firms 
in areas affected by the violence replaced around 5 percent of their missing workers 
and more than half of the firms replaced none. Many firms paid higher overtime 
wages to the remaining workers in order to minimize disruption in production.
5 Similar two-tier market structures have been documented in several markets in developing countries (see 
Fafchamps 2010 for a review). The coexistence of direct relationships alongside spot markets is also observed in 
several other contexts, such as perishable agricultural commodities, advertising, and diamonds. We are grateful to 
Jon Levin for pointing this out to us. 
6 The classification of affected and unaffected regions is strongly supported by the survey conducted in the 
summer following the crisis and is not controversial. See online Appendix A for details. 
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With many workers missing, firms suffered large reductions in total output. 
Online Appendix C, Figure A2 plots de-seasonalized export volumes around the 
period of the violence for the two separate groups of firms. The figure illustrates that 
the outbreak of the violence was a large and negative shock to the quantity of roses 
exported by the firms in the conflict locations.
In the survey, we asked several questions about whether the violence had been 
anticipated or not. Not a single firm among the 74 producers interviewed reported 
to have anticipated the shock and to have adjusted production or sales plans accord-
ingly. The violence was a large, unanticipated, and short-run shock to the production 
function of firms.
D. Relationship Characteristics
Using the export customs data, we build a dataset of buyer-seller relationships. 
Overall, we focus on the period August 2004 to August 2008, i.e., four entire sea-
sons. The violence occurred in January 2008, in the middle of the fourth season in 
the data.
We define the baseline sample of relationships as those links between an exporter 
(seller) and a foreign buyer that were active in the period prior to the violence. A 
relationship is active if the two parties transacted at least 20 times in the 20 weeks 
before the eruption of the violence. The data shows clear spikes in the distribution 
of shipments across relationships at one, two, three, four, and six shipments (trans-
actions) per week in the relevant period. The cutoff is chosen to distinguish between 
established relationships versus sporadic orders. Results are robust to alternative 
cutoffs.
In total, this gives 189 relationships in the baseline sample. Table 1, panel A, 
reports summary statistics for the relationships in the baseline sample. The average 
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics, Direct Relationships
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Panel A. Relationship characteristics
Number of transactions 189 60.52 35.70 20.00 140
Number of stems per week (in 1000s) 189 100.24 161.85 0.81 926.49
Average FOB price (Euro cents per stem) 189 11.37 8.37 1.14 58.46
Age (in days) 189 830.27 469.54 24.50 1286
Number of previous transactions 189 309.88 304.51 12.00 1204
Left censored (Yes = 1, No = 0) 189 0.40 0.49 0 1
Panel B. Number of relationships per buyer and seller
Number of relationships per seller 56 3.38 2.88 1 14
Number of relationships per buyer 71 2.66 2.83 1 14
Panel C. Estimated relationship values (season before the violence)
Estimated S (/ average weekly revenues) 157 3.84 3.65 0.75 30.72
Estimated U (/ average weekly revenues) 157 2.70 1.77 0.77 10.64
Estimated V (/ average weekly revenues) 157 1.61 3.28 0.00 25.50
Notes: The sample is given by all relationships that had at least 20 transactions in the 20 weeks immediately before 
the violence. Left censored refers to relationships that were already active before August 2004. Estimated S, U, and 
V are lower bounds to the value of the relationship as a whole, to the buyer, and to the seller respectively. Details on 
the computation of S, U, and V are given in Section IIIA.
Source: Authors’ calculations from customs records. See online Appendix A for data sources.
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relationship had 60 shipments in the 20 weeks preceding the violence. Immediately 
before the violence, contracting parties in the average relationship had transacted 
with each other 310 times. The first shipment in the average relationships occurred 
nearly two and a half years (830 days) before the beginning of the sample period.7
Exporters tend to specialize in one marketing channel. The majority of exporters 
either sells more than 90 percent of their produce through direct relationships, or 
7 These averages are left-censored, since they are computed from August 2004 onward. Since our customs 
export records begin in April 2004, we are able to distinguish relationships that were new in August 2004 from 
relationships that were active before. Among the 189 relationships in the baseline sample, 44 percent are classified 
as censored, i.e., were already active before August 2004. This confirms the findings of the survey, in which several 
respondents reported to have had relationships longer than a decade. 
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through the auctions. As a result, among the 100 established exporters, only 56 have 
at least one direct relationship with a foreign buyer. On average, exporters in the 
sample have three direct relationships (see Table 1, panel B). Similarly, there are 
71 buyers with at least a relationship. The average buyer has about two and a half 
Kenyan suppliers.
Figures 1 and 2 document stylized facts that guide the formulation of the model. 
Figure 1 shows that prices at the auctions are highly predictable.
Figure 2 shows that prices in relationships are more stable than prices at the 
auctions.
II. Theory
We now present a model of the relationship between a rose producer (seller) and 
a foreign buyer (buyer). The setup of the model matches qualitative features of the 
market under consideration. The model is analyzed under three scenarios: (i) the 
benchmark case with no contract enforcement; (ii) an extension with uncertainty 
over the seller’s type; and, finally, (iii) an extension to examine seller’s reaction to 
the violence. These three different scenarios are used to derive the three tests we 
conduct in the empirical section. We first turn to a version of the model with no 
contract enforcement, developed along the lines of the relational contracts  literature 
(see, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; and Levin 2003). The incentive compat-
ibility constraints of the model clarify how observable data on quantities transacted, 
prices in the relationships, and auction prices, can be used to compute lower bounds 
to the value of the relationship for the buyer and the seller. The model yields a test 
to establish whether the volume of trade in the relationship is limited by incentive 
compatibility constraints implied by the lack of contract enforcement (Test 1). The 
model is then extended to consider uncertainty over the seller’s type. In contrast to 
the case without uncertainty, the extension predicts a positive correlation between 
the value and the age of the relationship (Test 2). Finally, we study how reputational 
forces influence the seller’s reaction to the negative shock induced by the violence. 
Consistent with the interviews in the field, we model the violence as an unantici-
pated and observable shock that makes it impossible to deliver roses unless the seller 
undertakes additional unobservable effort (e.g., hire extra security, set up camps to 
host workers menaced by the violence). The model predicts an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between deliveries at the time of the violence and age of the relation-
ship (Test 3).8
A. Setup and First Best: Perfectly Enforceable Contracts
Time is an infinite sequence of periods  t ,  t = 0, 1, … . The buyer and the seller 
have an infinite horizon and share a common discount factor  δ < 1. Periods alter-
nate between high seasons  t = 0, 2, … , and low seasons  t = 1, 3, … . Low season 
variables and parameters are denoted with a lower bar (e.g.,  x ¯). Similarly, high sea-son variables and parameters are denoted with an upper bar (e.g.,  _ x ).
8 Section IV discusses alternative modeling assumptions. All proofs are in online Appendix B (Theory). 
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In each period, the seller can produce  q units of roses at cost  c(q) =   cq 2   ___2 . 
The buyer’s payoffs from sourcing  q units of roses from this particular seller is 
r(q) = vq if  q ≤  q ∗ and  r(q) = v q ∗ otherwise. The parameter  v captures the buyer’s 
willingness to pay for roses to be sold in the downstream market. The kink at  q ∗ 
captures the buyer’s desire for reliability. For simplicity, we assume  q 
¯
∗ =  _ q ∗ =  q ∗ , 
i.e., the buyer’s desired quantity of flowers is constant across seasons.
There is also a spot market where buyers and sellers can trade roses, the auction. 
The price at which sellers can sell,  p t m , oscillates between  p t m =  _ p in high seasons 
and  p t m =  p ¯ <  
_
 p in low seasons. The buyer can purchase roses at the auctions at 
price  p t b =  p t m + κ, with  κ > 0 capturing additional transport and intermediation 
costs.
For expositional clarity, it is worth considering the case with perfect contract 
enforcement first. Consistent with practices in the industry, we assume that contracts 
are negotiated at the beginning of each high season. Parties agree on constant prices 
for the high season and the subsequent low season.9 A contract negotiated in period 
t, then, is given by   t =  { _ q t ,  q ¯t+1 ,  w t  } . The contract specifies quantities to be deliv-ered in the high season  t ,  _ q t , in the following low season,  q ¯t+1 , and a unit price to be paid upon delivery of roses in each season,  w t .
The seller can sell at the auctions and to the buyer simultaneously. Contracts with 
the buyer cannot be contingent on the seller’s sales at the auctions. The buyer has 
all the ex ante bargaining power. The buyer offers a contract to maximize her profits 
across two subsequent high and low seasons subject to the seller participation con-
straint. We denote the optimal contract   t ∗ =  { _ q t ∗ ,  q ¯ t+1 
∗ ,  w t ∗ } .
We assume that (i) the buyer never buys at the auctions ( κ > v ); (ii) trade between 
the seller and the buyer is efficient in both seasons ( v >  _ p ); and (iii) it is effi-
cient for a seller supplying  q ∗ to the buyer to sell at the auctions in the high season 
( _ p > c q ∗ ) but not in the low season ( c q ∗ >  p 
¯
). We normalize  p 
¯
= 0 and omit the 
period subscript  t when this does not create confusion.
Under these assumptions, the optimal contract displays two features that char-
acterize the data. First, there are lower seasonal fluctuations in the sales to the 
buyer than in the sales to the auctions. Second, there is price compression: the 
price in the relationship lies in between auction prices in the high and low seasons, 
 p 
¯
<  w ∗ <  _ p  . In a relationship with perfect contract enforcement the optimal con-
tract is repeated forever.
B. No Enforcement
As revealed by interviews in the field, contracts enforcing the delivery of roses 
are not available. This, potentially, generates two problems. First, the buyer might 
refuse to pay the seller once the roses have been delivered. Second, the seller might 
fail to deliver the quantity of roses agreed with the buyer. Buyers and sellers use 
relational contracts to overcome lack of enforcement.
9 The complexity associated with indexing contracts on weekly auction prices and the desire to smooth income 
profiles are likely forces behind the use of constant prices. We abstract from these forces and take constant prices as 
a fact of commercial life in our environment. 
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A relational contract is a plan   R =  { _ q t ,  q ¯t+1 ,  w t } t=0, 2, … 
∞ that specifies quantities 
to be delivered,  
_ q t and  q ¯t+1 , and unit prices,  w t , for all future high and low seasons. Parties agree to terminate the relationship and obtain their outside options forever 
following any deviation. The outside option of the seller, denoted  V t O , is to sell at the 
auctions forever. The outside option of the buyer is exogenously given and denoted 
U t O .10
Given the crucial role played by the incentive compatibility constraints in the 
empirical analysis, it is worth describing them in detail. Denote with  U t and  V t the 
net present value of the payoffs from the relationship at time  t for the buyer and the 
seller respectively. The buyer must prefer to pay the seller rather than terminating 
the relationship, i.e.,
(1)  δ ( U ¯ t+1 −  U ¯t+1 O ) ≥  w t ×  
_ q t for all t = 0, 2, … 
in the high seasons and
(2)  δ ( _ U t+2 −  _ U t+2 O ) ≥  w t ×  q ¯t+1 for all t = 0, 2, … 
in the low seasons.
Similarly, the seller must prefer to produce and deliver the roses to the buyer 
rather than selling at the auctions. In the high seasons, the seller produces roses for 
the auctions regardless of the relational contract with the buyer. The seller’s best 
deviation, therefore, is to side-sell to the spot market roses produced for the buyer, 
i.e.,
(3)  δ ( V ¯  t+1 −  V ¯t+1 O ) ≥  ( 
_ p −  w t )   _ q t  for all t = 0, 2, … 
In the low seasons, instead, the seller never sells to the auctions. The seller’s best 
deviation is to not produce, i.e.,
(4)  δ ( _ V t+2 −  _ V t+2 O ) ≥ − ( w t ×  q ¯t+1 ) + c( q ¯t+1 ) for all t = 0, 2, … 
The buyer offers a relational contract   R to maximize the discounted value of 
future profits subject to (1), (2), (3), and (4).11 We denote the optimal relational 
contract   t  R ∗  =  { _ q t R ,  q ¯ t+1 
R ,  w t R }  . 
The optimal contract still features price compression, i.e.,  p 
¯
<  w t R <  _ p  . Price 
compression implies that (4) is never binding while (3) always is. Summing the two 
constraints (1) and (3) we can write
(5)  δ ( S ¯t+1 R ) ≥  
_ p t ×  _ q t ,
10 Given the assumption that the buyer never purchases at the auctions ( κ > v ), the buyer’s outside option is to 
search, possibly at some additional costs, for alternative suppliers. For simplicity, we do not endogenize the value 
of the buyer’s outside option. 
11 Constraint (3) and the assumption that the seller’s outside option is to sell forever at the auctions imply that 
the seller’s participation constraint is satisfied. 
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where  S ¯t+1 
R =  V ¯t+1 +  U ¯t+1 −  V ¯t+1 
O −  U ¯t+1 
O is the value of the future rents generated 
by the relationship—henceforth, the value of the relationship.
Lack of enforcement, therefore, implies that the amount of roses traded in the 
high seasons,  
_ q t R , might be constrained by the future value of the relationship. The 
incentive constraint (5) illustrates how data on auction prices  _ p t and volumes of 
trade in the high seasons,  
_ q t R , both directly observed in the data, can be used to 
(i) estimate a lower bound to the value of the relationship, denoted  S ˆ t , and (ii) test 
whether the incentive constraint (5) and, by implication, both incentive constraints 
(1) and (3), are binding.12 The logic of the test is as follows. The future value of 
the relationship,  S ˆ it , does not depend on current auction prices. If (5) is binding, 
therefore, a small and unanticipated increase in prices at the auctions should lead 
to a corresponding decrease in the quantity traded,  q i, t ω it ∗ R  . In particular, holding 
 δ ( S ¯t+1 R ) constant and taking logs, a binding constraint (5) implies an elasticity equal to minus one between  q i, t ω it ∗ R and prices at the auctions  p i,t ω it ∗ . This observation, sug-
gests a test for whether the incentive constraint (5) is binding, i.e., for whether the 
volume of trade is constrained by the future value of the relationship. This gives us:
Test 1: If lack of enforcement constrains the volume of trade in the relationship 
the elasticity of the quantity of roses traded in the high season to auction prices 
equals minus one.
The analysis in the empirical section reveals that the volume of trade in the rela-
tionships is constrained by lack of enforcement. The model yields an additional pre-
diction: the quantity traded in the high season  
_ q t R and the value of the relationship 
do not depend on the age of the relationship. This prediction directly follows from 
well-known results in the literature that the optimal relational contract is stationary 
(see, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; and Levin 2003). The data reject this 
prediction of the model. This leads to the next extension of the model in which 
uncertainty over the seller’s type is introduced.
C. No Enforcement and Uncertainty about the Seller’s Type
Interviews in the field suggest that concerns over a seller’s reputation for reliabil-
ity are of paramount importance among buyers and sellers. First, delays and irreg-
ularity in rose deliveries are costly to the buyer. Second, the sector has expanded 
rapidly and many sellers lack a previous record of success in export markets.13
The literature has formalized reputational concerns by introducing uncertainty 
over players’ type. We introduce uncertainty about the seller’s reliability as follows. 
There are two types of sellers: reliable and unreliable. A reliable seller can always 
deliver flowers to the buyer. An unreliable seller, instead, is subject to temporary 
12 Similarly, the incentive constraints (1) and (3) illustrate how data on auction prices  _ p t , relationship’s volumes 
in the high season  
_ q t R , and prices  w t R can be used to estimate lower bounds to the value of the relationship for the 
buyer (given by  U ˆ t =  w t R  _ q t R ) and for the seller (given by  V ˆ t =  ( _ p t −  w t R )   _ q t R ). The lower bound estimate of the 
value of the relationship,  S ˆ t , is given by  S ˆ t =  U ˆ t +  V ˆ t . 
13 Buyers must, of course, also develop a reputation for respecting contracts. Relative to suppliers, which are all 
clustered in a handful of locations, buyers are scattered in several destination countries. Suppliers, therefore, can 
share information about cheating buyers more easily than buyers can share information about cheating suppliers. 
As a result, uncertainty over a seller’s reliability might be more relevant than uncertainty over buyer’s reliability. 
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shocks that make delivery of roses to the buyer impossible. These shocks can be 
interpreted as delivery failures that occur because of problems in harvesting, cool-
ing, or transporting roses. These problems are difficult to control due to inadequate 
technology or to agency problems between the seller and her workers. The probabil-
ity of a shock conditional on the seller being an unreliable type,  λ, is known to both 
parties and is constant over time. The type of the seller is unknown to both parties. 
At the beginning of the relationship, both the buyer and the seller believe that the 
seller is reliable with probability  θ 0 . 
Within each period the timing of events is as follows. First, the seller produces 
and incurs costs according to her production plan. After having produced, the seller 
observes whether the negative shock has been realized. If the shock has been real-
ized, the produced roses are not suitable for delivery to the buyer. All roses are then 
sold at the auctions and the seller learns to be the unreliable type.14 If no shock is 
realized, the seller updates beliefs and decides whether to sell roses to the buyer as 
specified in the relational contract or side-sell to the auctions.
Contract terms, trade outcomes, and relationship’s length are not observed by 
other market participants. The seller’s outside option,  V t 0 , is to sell on the market 
forever, as before. We assume that the buyer’s outside option,  U t 0 , is larger than 
the value of a relationship in which beliefs about the seller’s type are sufficiently 
pessimistic.
Over time the buyer observes the history of delivery realizations and updates 
beliefs. Consider an equilibrium in which the seller delivers flowers whenever there 
has been no shock. In such an equilibrium, after the first delivery failure, the buyer 
immediately believes the seller to be unreliable and terminates the relationship.15 
After  τ consecutive deliveries both parties hold beliefs  θ τ given by
(6)  θ τ =   θ 0   _____________    θ 0 +  (1 −  θ 0 ) (1 − λ) τ  , 
with  θ τ+1 >  θ τ for all  τ and  ( θ τ+1 −  θ τ ) >  ( θ τ+2 −  θ τ+1 ) for all  τ sufficiently large. 
This last observation implies that after a certain point, additional deliveries have a 
decreasing positive impact on beliefs as uncertainty over the seller’s type vanishes. 
The expected probability of delivery is given by  μ τ =  θ τ + (1 −  θ τ )(1 − λ). 
The analysis of this model is similar to the one in the previous section. The pos-
sibility of learning, however, introduces dynamics into the model. Expected per 
period surplus at age  τ is increasing in the probability of delivery  μ τ  . Conditional 
on a history of consistent delivery, the expected value of the relationship at 
age  τ,  S R ( θ τ ), increases over time. If beliefs  θ τ are such that the constraint (5) is 
binding , the quantity traded in the high seasons,  
_ q  R ∗  ( θ τ ), and the relationship value, 
S  τ , increase with the age of the relationship. As mentioned above, the analysis in the 
14 This assumption is made for both realism and simplicity. Roses that are not suitable for delivery to the 
buyer, e.g., because of minor delays or packaging problems, can still be sold at the auctions, possibly at a discount. 
Ignoring the discount simplifies the algebra without altering the main results. 
15 In such an equilibrium, therefore, the seller never has more information than the buyer during the course of 
the relationship. This greatly simplifies the analysis. 
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empirical section reveals that the volume of trade in the relationships is constrained 
by lack of enforcement, i.e., (5) is binding (Test 1). This leads to the following:
Test 2: Lack of enforcement and learning about the seller’s type imply the value 
of the relationship increases with the age of the relationship. In contrast, lack of 
enforcement alone implies the value of the relationship does not correlate with the 
age of the relationship.
The evidence in Section III supports the predictions of the model with uncertainty 
over the seller’s type. Analyzing how the relationship responds to the violence offers 
an opportunity to derive further predictions from the model with uncertainty over 
the seller’s type and distinguish it from alternative mechanisms.16
D. Maintaining Reputation During the Violence
The electoral violence occurred in the middle of the high season, a few weeks 
before the Valentine’s Day peak. We assume the violence occurs after production 
plans have been executed, production costs incurred, and a fraction  γ ∈  (0, 1) of 
planned sales already delivered. Consistent with interviews conducted in the field, 
we model the violence as an observable and unanticipated shock that made it harder 
for sellers to deliver roses. The violence was a highly unusual event. During the 
violence sellers could undertake a variety of costly actions to mitigate the resulting 
disruptions and enhance the chances of delivering roses as usual. For example, sell-
ers could (i) stop selling flowers to the auctions; (ii) set up camps to temporarily 
host workers menaced by the violence so that roses could be harvested on time; and 
(iii) hire extra security and coordinate transport with other firms. These actions are 
not relevant during normal business activity and, therefore, are not included in the 
baseline model of the previous sections. The empirical section concludes providing 
direct evidence consistent with firms having undertaken this type of action to miti-
gate the negative effects of the violence.
The amount of resources invested to mitigate the effects of the violence is difficult 
to monitor for foreign buyers. For simplicity, we model those actions as unobserv-
able effort  e that enhances the likelihood of delivery. Specifically, we assume that a 
seller exerting effort  e has a probability of completing delivery equal to ( μ τ ⋅ e ).17 
This assumption means that a seller not exerting effort has no chances of completing 
delivery of roses during the violence. The costly effort, however, mitigates the con-
sequences of the violence and, in the limit, restores deliveries as usual when  e → 1. 
The cost of effort is given by  Γ(e) and is assumed to satisfy properties guaranteeing 
the existence of an interior equilibrium.18
16 Other mechanisms, however, are also potentially consistent with the dynamics predicted by the model with 
learning. For example, there could be “learning by trading” , in which parties accumulate capital that is specific to 
the relationship and increase the amount of flowers transacted over time. 
17 Recall that  μ τ is the expected probability of delivery under normal circumstances in a relationship of age  τ . 
For simplicity, we assume that the negative reliability shock hits the unreliable type with probability  λ after  γ q 
¯τ
 R 
roses have been delivered. This assumption captures in a parsimonious way the timing of the violence and ensures 
deliveries at the time of the violence are informative about the seller’s type. 
18 Namely,  Γ ′ (⋅) ≥ 0,  Γ ″ (⋅) > 0 ,  Γ ′ (0) = 0 and  lim e→1 Γ ′ (e) = ∞. 
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We are interested in deriving predictions between deliveries during the violence 
and the age of the relationship  τ . Denote by  e ̃τ the buyer’s beliefs about the effort 
exerted by the seller. In the equilibrium: (i) given buyer’s beliefs, the seller exerts 
effort  e τ to maximize expected payoffs, and (ii) buyer’s beliefs are correct. The buyer 
observes whether roses have been delivered ( d = 1 ) or not ( d = 0 ) and, given prior 
beliefs  θ τ and about effort  e ̃τ   , updates posterior beliefs about the seller’s type,  θ τ+1 d , 
using Bayes’ rule.
Delivery of the remaining share  (1 − γ)  of planned roses occurs only if a nega-
tive reliability shock is not realized. Conditional on delivery completion, posterior 
beliefs,  θ τ+1 d=1, are independent of the buyer’s beliefs  e ̃τ and identical to the beliefs 
the buyer would have had had the violence not occurred. Following a delivery, then, 
the relationship continues as originally planned.19 Posterior beliefs following a 
delivery failure,  θ τ+1 d=0, must be more pessimistic. For any buyer’s beliefs  e ̃τ > 0, a 
delivery failure could still be caused by the negative reliability shock. This implies 
 θ τ+1 d=0 <  θ τ . In contrast to the case of no violence, however, a delivery failure does 
not necessarily reveal the seller to be an unreliable type since the failure could also 
be due to the violence ( e ̃τ < 1 ). The buyer ends the relationship only if posterior 
beliefs are sufficiently pessimistic. When this is the case, both parties receive their 
outside option.
Denote  V D ( θ τ+1 d ) the seller’s payoff after delivery ( d = 1 ) and after non-delivery 
( d = 0 ). The seller chooses  e τ to maximize her payoff taking as given the buyer’s 
beliefs. The seller solves
(7)  e τ ∈  arg max e e μ τ V 
D ( θ τ+1 d=1) +  (1 − e μ t )   V D ( θ τ+1 d=0) − Γ(e) 
which yields first order condition
(8)  μ τ ( V D ( θ τ+1 d=1) −  V D ( θ τ+1 d=0)) =  Γ ′ ( e τ ). 
Inspection of the first order condition reveals that incentives to exert effort are ini-
tially increasing in  τ . Intuitively, for sufficiently low  τ, a delivery failure leads to pes-
simistic beliefs and to the end of the relationship. At early stages, older relationships 
are both associated with higher returns to effort  μ τ and higher continuation values for 
the seller,  V D ( θ τ+1 d=1) . However, in sufficiently old relationships, the buyer is very con-
fident about the seller’s type and observed deliveries do not affect the buyer’s beliefs. 
The continuation values for the seller following a delivery and a delivery failure get 
closer and incentives to exert effort vanish.20 This leads to the following:
Test 3: The likelihood of delivery during the violence is inverted-U shaped in the 
age of the relationship.
19 In particular, note that the binding incentive constraint (5) implies the buyer cannot further incentivize deliv-
ery during the violence. Given posterior beliefs, the buyer would renege on any promise of higher prices or of a 
higher continuation value to the seller following a delivery at the violence. 
20 This provides the intuition for the result. The formal proof must take into account the endogenously deter-
mined buyer’s beliefs about effort  e ̃τ . See online Appendix B for details. 
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E. Summary
The model provides the following three tests:
Test 1: If lack of enforcement constrains the volume of trade in the relationship 
the elasticity of the quantity of roses traded in the high season to auction prices 
equals minus one. 
Test 2: Lack of enforcement and learning about the seller’s type imply the value 
of the relationship increases with the age of the relationship. In contrast, lack of 
enforcement alone implies the value of the relationship does not correlate with the 
age of the relationship.
Test 3: Lack of enforcement and learning about the seller’s type predicts an 
inverted-U shaped relationship between deliveries at the time of the violence and 
relationship’s age.
III. Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results. We begin by introducing notation and 
describing how we compute key variables for the empirical tests. We then turn to 
the three tests derived in the theory section: (i) is the volume of trade constrained by 
lack of enforcement? (Test 1); (ii) does the value of the relationship increase with 
age? (Test 2); and (iii) are deliveries during the violence an inverted-U shaped func-
tion of relationship’s age, as predicted by the reputation model? (Test 3). Finally, 
we conclude by providing direct evidence of the effort exerted by sellers to protect 
valuable relationships during the violence.
A. Incentive Constraints and the Value of Relationships
The first two empirical tests derived in the theory section are based on the incen-
tive compatibility constraint (5). From an empirical point of view, the appeal of the 
incentive constraints is that volumes of roses traded in the relationship,  
_ q t R , and 
auction prices,  
_ p , are directly observable in the data. Besides allowing us to derive 
a simple test for whether lack of enforcement constraints the volume of trade in the 
relationship, the incentive constraint also allows us to compute a lower bound to 
the value of the relationship. This lower bound does not rely on information on cost 
structures and expectations of future trade which are typically unobservable and/or 
difficult to estimate.
Before bringing the incentive constraint (5) to the data it is useful to introduce 
some notation. In line with practices in the industry, business seasons (denoted with 
t ) start in mid-August. For example, the violence occurred in the middle of the 
fourth season for which we have data. Each season counts 52 weeks (denoted with 
ω ∈ {1, 2, …, 52} ). We denote sellers with subscript  s , buyers with subscript  b, and 
relationships (i.e., pairs of sellers and buyers) with subscript  i. We will use seller  s 
and buyer  b subscripts in cross-sectional specifications and relationship  subscripts  i 
in panel specifications that allow to control for relationship fixed effects. With this 
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notation,  q i,t ω R will denote the quantity traded in relationship  i and  p i,t ω the relevant 
auction price in week  ω of season  t . Note that auction prices,  p i,t ω , are indexed by  i 
since different relationships trade different types of roses that are sold at the auctions 
at different prices.21
Recall the model implies that only the incentive constraint corresponding to the 
maximum temptation to deviate in each season has to be considered. For each rela-
tionship  i and season  t , therefore, we focus on the time in which the value of roses 
traded in the relationship and valued at market prices is highest. A season in the 
model is defined by two consecutive periods with alternating high and low prices. In 
practice, however, a season is a sequence of 52 weeks. Recall that in the model any 
deviation from either the buyer or the seller leads to the termination of the relation-
ship. In taking the model to the data, therefore, we need to choose the length of the 
period after which the relationship is terminated if any party deviates. We chose a 
week and show below that results are robust to the choice of longer windows.
For each relationship  i in season  t, define week  ω it ∗ as the week of season  t for 
which the value of roses traded in relationship  i and valued at market prices  p i,t ω is 
highest, i.e.,
 (9)  ω it ∗ =  arg max ω 
 { q i,t ω R ×  p i,t ω } . 
The lower bounds to the value of relationship  i in season  t , denoted by  S ˆ it , is then 
given
(10)   S ˆ it =  q i,t ω it ∗ R ×  p i,t ω it ∗  . 
 S ˆ it and  q i,t ω it ∗ R are the two main variables on which Test 1 and Test 2 are performed.22
The estimated value of the relationships,  S ˆ it , is our main outcome variable for Test 
1 and Test 2. The tests exploit variation in  S ˆ it across seasons  t and relationships  i. 
The tests are conducted under a variety of empirical specifications that control for 
combinations of relationship, season, and seasonality fixed effects. Before describ-
ing the results, it is therefore useful to illustrate the sources of variation in  S ˆ it . There 
are three main sources of variation in  S ˆ it : (i) the time of season  t during which the 
market value of roses traded in relationship  i is highest,  ω it ∗; (ii) the prices at the 
auctions during the window  ω it ∗ ,  p i,t ω it ∗ ; and (iii) the quantities transacted during the 
window  ω it ∗ ,  q i,t ω it ∗ R .
Figure 3 illustrates the first source of variation by reporting the distribution of 
weeks  ω it ∗ in the sample of relationships active in the season before the violence. The 
week of Valentine’s Day is the time during which the market value of roses traded 
in relationship  i is highest for about 40 percent of relationships. Other prominent 
21 We only know the average weekly prices at the auctions for large and small roses. We derive a relationship 
specific auction price  p i,t ω using a weighted average of prices for large and small roses with weights given by the 
average unit weight of roses traded in the relationship. We show below results are robust to different choices of the 
weights. 
22 As noted in footnote 12, the individual incentive compatibility constraints for the buyer (1) and for the seller 
(3) yield lower bounds to the value of the relationship for each party. Denoting  w i,t ω the price paid in relationship  i in 
week  ω of season  t, these values are respectively given by  U ˆ it =  q i,t  ω it ∗ R ×  w i,t ω it ∗  and  V ˆ it =  q i,t ω it ∗ R ×  ( p t ω it ∗ −  w i,t ω it ∗ ) . 
Note that if (5) is binding, then both (1) and (3) must be binding and the lower bounds provide exact estimates to 
the value of the relationship for each party. Table 4 reports results on these outcomes too. 
2928 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEpTEMbER 2015
weeks are around Mother’s or Women’s Days, which typically fall in March (e.g., 
the United Kingdom, Russia, Japan) or later in May (e.g., other European countries 
and the United States) depending on the country. In the reminder of the analysis, 
seasonality is controlled for by including dummies for the week of the season  ω it ∗.
The second source of variation,  p i,t ω it ∗ , combines variation in the price of roses 
at the auctions and in the unit weight of roses traded in the relationship during the 
window  ω it ∗. Since unit weights of roses traded within a given relationship are rel-
atively stable over time, the main source of variation is given by auction prices.23 
Figures 1 and 2 show seasonal variation in average prices at the auctions. Variation in 
 p i,t ω it ∗ across seasons and relationships, however, is also driven by variation in the rel-
ative auction prices of large and small roses. Figure 4 shows a significant amount of 
variation in the relative price of large and small roses at the auctions both within and 
across seasons. For example, during the Valentine’s Day week, the ratio of prices 
for large and small roses has varied from 1.39 to 1.72 in the three seasons before the 
violence.
Figure 5 illustrates the third source of variation by reporting the distribution of 
quantities traded during the window  ω it ∗,  q i,t ω it ∗ R , in the sample of relationships active 
in the season before the violence. The quantity  q i,t ω it ∗ R is normalized by the average 
weekly quantity traded in the relationship during the season. The median  relationship 
has a ratio just above  2 , and there is substantial variation across relationships with 
values from  0.83 to  7.05 .24
For the 189 relationships in the baseline sample, Table 1, panel C shows that the 
aggregate value of the relationship  S ˆ it in the season that preceded the violence was 
23 We show below that results are robust to holding constant the unit weight of roses sold in the relationship. 
24 For most relationships the window  ω it ∗ falls at times of particularly high demand, such as Valentine’s Day. This 
implies that the ratio is larger than one for most relationships. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Highest Temptation Weeks
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the calendar weeks in which the incentive constraint is more likely to 
bind. This is given by the week of the season in which the value of roses traded in the relationship and valued at auc-
tion prices is highest. The sample is given by all the relationships active in the season before the violence.
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384 percent of the average weekly revenues in the average relationship. The values 
for the buyer  U ˆ it and seller  V ˆ it respectively are 270 percent and 161 percent of aver-
age weekly revenues.25
25 Under free-entry, initial sunk investments dissipate the ex post rents generated by the relationship (see, e.g., 
Shapiro 1983). The estimates yield a lower bound to the fixed costs of starting a relationship and can be compared 
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Figure 4. Variation in Prices of Large and Small Roses at the Auction
Notes: This figure depicts the evolution of the ratio of prices for large and small roses at the auctions in the three sea-
sons preceding the violence. At the time of the Valentine’s Day week, week 26 (referenced by vertical line), when 
for most relationships the incentive constraint is most likely to be binding (see Figure 3), the ratio of prices for large 
and small roses has varied from 1.39 to 1.72 in the three seasons in our sample.
Figure 5. Stretch in Volumes at the Maximum Temptation to Deviate
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the ratio between the volume of roses traded in the week in which the 
incentive constraint is more likely to bind and the average weekly sales in the relationship. The sample is given by 
all the relationships active in the season before the violence.
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B. Test 1: Binding Incentive Constraint
The first test we address is whether the incentive constraint (5) is binding (Test 1). 
A binding incentive constraint (5) would imply that lack of enforcement constrains 
the amount of flowers traded in the relationship. The logic of the test is as follows. 
The future value of the relationship,  S ˆ it , does not depend on current auction prices. 
If (5) is binding, therefore, a small unanticipated increase in prices at the auctions 
should lead to a corresponding decrease in the quantity traded,  q i,t ω it ∗ R  . There should 
be an elasticity equal to minus one between  q i,t ω it ∗ R and prices at the auctions  p i,t ω it ∗ .
In taking this prediction to the data, we need to consider the nature of fluctuations 
in auction prices as well as the frequency of price changes. In the model, prices 
oscillate deterministically and are known in advance. In practice, although Figure 1 
shows that much variation in auction prices is predictable, deviations from expected 
prices still occur. Furthermore, the future value of the relationship could depend 
on expectation of future prices. In the baseline specification in Table 2 we control 
for expectations about future auction prices by including both season and seasonal-
ity fixed effects. Seasonality fixed effects are accounted for by including dummies 
for the week of the season  ω it ∗ from which estimates are derived. The combina-
tion of season and seasonality effects implies that variation in prices at the auctions 
to structural estimates of fixed costs of exporting. Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) report that in the Colombian 
chemicals industry, fixed costs of exports in each year represent 1 percent of the export revenues of the firm. The 
corresponding figure for the initial sunk costs is between 18 to 42 percent. Our estimates are a conservative lower 
bound since we focus on a temptation window of one week. 
Table 2—Binding Incentive Compatibility Constraint (Test 1)
Trade volume Relationship value Price
(1) (2) (3)
Price at auction (ln) −0.936** 0.064 0.313
(0.371) (0.371) (0.193)
Relationship fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Seasonality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.861 0.867 0.606
Observations 430 430 430
Notes: The table reports correlations between prices at the auctions and relationship outcomes 
at the time of the maximum temptation to deviate. A binding incentive compatibility constraint 
implies a minus one elasticity of quantity of roses traded in the relationship with respect to auc-
tion prices at the time of the largest temptation to deviate (Test 1). All variables are in logs. The 
outcomes are computed for all seasons before the violence and the sample refers to relation-
ships that were active during the period. The sample excludes relationships that are in the base-
line sample but were not active in the season preceding the violence and includes relationships 
that did not survive until the violence season. Following business practices in the industry, a 
season starts in mid-August. The three considered seasons are those starting in August 2004, 
2005, and 2006. Seasonality fixed effects are dummies for the week of the season in which the 
maximum aggregate temptation to deviate occurs. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm 
level are reported in parenthesis.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 captures unanticipated variation around the expected prices. To keep closer to the 
model formulation, in which all price variation is known in advance, we also report 
results without controlling for season and seasonality fixed effects in Table 3.26
Table 2 reports correlations between prices at the auctions and quantity 
 q i,t ω it ∗ R  (column 1) and relationship’s value  S ˆ it (column 2). Controlling for relation-
ship, season, and seasonality fixed effects, Table 2 shows that higher prices at the 
auctions lead to a proportional reduction in quantity traded (column 1) and that, 
as a result, the aggregate value of roses traded remains constant (column 2). The 
estimated elasticity between quantity  q i,t ω it ∗ R and auction prices is equal to ( −0.936 ), 
which is very close to (and not statistically different from) the minus one implied 
by the binding incentive constraint (5). The model also implies that changing prices 
paid to the seller does not help relaxing the aggregate incentive constraint (5) since 
a reduction in the seller’s temptation to deviate is compensated by an equal increase 
in the buyer’s temptation, and vice-versa. Column 3 shows that, indeed, prices in the 
relationship at the time the constraint binds do not respond to auction prices.
Figure 6 provides further evidence consistent with the findings in Table 2 that par-
ties adjust to unanticipated fluctuations in auction prices. The figure shows that the 
number of relationships ending in a given week does not correlate with price at the 
26 By including season, seasonality, and relationship fixed effects, all the variation in the price variable comes 
from how heavy, relative to previous relationship sales and other firms’ sales in the same season and week, the roses 
traded are and the ratio of big/small rose prices at auction. A robustness check in Table 3 shows that the results are 
robust to hold constant unit weight of roses traded in the relationship. This reassures us that changes in the compo-
sition of traded roses at the time of particularly high prices do not drive the results. 
Figure 6. Relationships Do Not End When Auction Prices Are High
Notes: The figure shows that the number of relationships ending in a given week does not correlate with the price at 
the auctions in that week during the three seasons preceding the violence. This is consistent with the fact that prices 
at the auctions are highly predictable. In a regression of the number of relationships dying in a given week that con-
trols for week and season dummies, the coefficient on the violence period is positive and significant. The R2 for the 
same regression is 0.57. Regardless of whether week dummies are controlled for or not, the level of prices at the 
auctions does not predict the number of relationships dying. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
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auctions in that week during the seasons preceding the violence period. Regardless 
of whether week dummies are controlled for or not, the level of prices at the auctions 
does not predict the number of relationships ending.
Table 3 performs robustness checks. Columns 1 and 4 omit seasonality fixed 
effects, columns 2 and 5 omit season fixed effects. Columns 3 and 6, instead, repeat 
the exercise holding constant the unit weight of flowers traded in the relationship. 
The table shows that results are robust to using different sources of variation in the 
auction prices at the time of the highest temptation to deviate.
C. Test 2: Relationship’s Value and Age
Table 2 provides evidence that lack of enforcement constrains the volume of roses 
traded. We now explore whether the value of the relationship correlates with the age 
of the relationship (Test 2). We begin with a graphic exploration. Figure 7 plots the 
distribution of the (logs of the) estimated values of the relationship,  S ˆ it , for three 
different samples of relationships in the season before the violence: relationships 
in the baseline sample that were active at the Valentine’s Day peak of the season 
prior to the violence; younger relationships in the baseline sample that were not 
yet active during the Valentine’s Day peak of the season prior to the violence; and 
relationships that were active during the Valentine’s Day peak of the season prior to 
the violence but that are not in the baseline sample since they did not survive until 
the violence period. Figure 7 shows two patterns: (i) young relationships had lower 
values than established relationships, and (ii) relationships that have survived have 
higher values than relationships that did not.
Table 3—Binding Incentive Compatibility Constraint (Test 1): Robustness Checks
Trade volume Relationship value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price at auction (ln) −0.818*** −1.184*** −0.940** 0.182 −0.184 0.06
(0.171) (0.324) (0.414) (0.171) (0.324) (0.414)
Relationship fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Seasonality fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant unit weight No No Yes No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.847 0.842 0.856 0.854 0.849 0.863
Observations 430 430 430 430 430 430
Notes: The table reports correlations between prices at the auctions and relationship outcomes at the time of the 
maximum temptation to deviate. A binding incentive compatibility constraint implies a minus one elasticity of 
quantity of roses traded in the relationship with respect to auction prices at the time of the largest temptation to devi-
ate (Test 1). All variables are in logs. The outcomes are computed for all seasons before the violence and the sample 
refers to relationships that were active during the period. The sample excludes relationships that are in the baseline 
sample but were not active in the season preceding the violence and includes relationships that did not survive until 
the violence season. Following business practices in the industry, a season starts in mid-August. The three consid-
ered seasons are those starting in August 2004, 2005, and 2006. Seasonality fixed effects are dummies for the week 
of the season in which the maximum aggregate temptation to deviate occurs. Constant unit weight specifications 
assign relevant auction prices to the relationship holding unit weights of roses traded in the relationship constant 
over time. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The former observation, however, cannot be interpreted as evidence that the value 
of a relationship increases with age. First, as the second fact suggests, there could be 
selection effects. Second, in a mechanical way the estimated value of a relationship 
that is too young to have gone through a seasonal peak is low. Third, the relation-
ship between the two variables of interest could be non-monotonic, in which case 
Figure 7 would be misleading. We therefore turn to a formal econometric analysis.
Table 4 presents correlation patterns between relationship age and the main rela-
tionship outcomes. Equation (6) in the theory section shows that beliefs about the 
seller’s type are an increasing and (eventually) concave function of the past number 
of shipments in the relationship. Accordingly, in panel A, we measure age of the 
relationship as the log of the number of past shipments and denote this variable as 
log(AG E sb ) in cross-sectional specifications and  log(AG E it ) in the panel. For ease of 
interpretation, however, in panel B we also report specifications in which the age 
of the relationship is measured in level. Odd numbered columns in Table 4 report 
results that exploit cross-sectional variation in the season before the violence, i.e.,
(11)  log ( y ˆsb ) =  μ s +  η b + β log (AG E sb ) +  ε sb , 
Figure 7. Surviving Relationships Afford Higher Aggregate Temptations
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the (log of the) value of relationships in the season 2006/2007. The 
value is given by the maximum temptation to deviate. The temptation to deviate is the value at the auctions of quan-
tities traded in a relationship in a week. In a given season, the maximum temptation to deviate is given by the highest 
temptation to deviate during the season. Among the relationships in our baseline sample, those active immediately 
before the violence period, relationships that were already active before 2006/2007 are depicted with a solid line, 
new relationships with a dashed line, and relationships that were active in 2006/2007 but did not survive with a 
light gray line. The figure displays that relationships with higher values are more likely to survive. The equality of 
mean (and distribution) between surviving and dying relationships is rejected with 1 percent confidence interval. 
New relationships also have lower values. The equality of mean (and distribution) between new and established 
relationships is rejected with 1 percent confidence interval. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
De
ns
ity
4 6 8 10 12 14
Value of the relationship (logs)
Established relationships surviving until 2007/2008
Relationships that did not survive until 2007/2008
New relationships surviving until 2007/2008
2934 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEpTEMbER 2015
where  y ˆsb are the outcomes of interest,  μ s and  η b are seller and buyer fixed effects 
respectively and  ε sb is an error term. The regression is estimated on the sample of 
relationships that were active in the season before the violence.27
From a cross section it is not possible to disentangle age and cohort effects. 
The inclusion of buyer and seller fixed effects controls for cohort effects at the 
 contractual-party level, but does not control for relationship cohort effects, the fact 
that more valuable relationships might have started earlier. Moreover,  cross-sectional 
correlations could be driven by selection effects. Even numbered columns in Table 2, 
therefore, present results from an alternative specification that exploits the time 
 variation across seasons. This allows us to include relationship fixed effects that 
control for time-invariant relationship characteristics, including cohort effects. With 
panel data, it is not possible to separately identify the linear effect of age, cohort, 
and season effects since cohort, age, and season effects are collinear. However, our 
measure of the age of the relationship in panel A,  log (AG E it ) , is a non-linear function 
27 This specification adapts the ones in McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Banerjee and Duflo (2000) to our 
environment. 
Table 4—Age of the Relationships and Outcomes (Test 2)
Trade volume Relationship value Buyer value Seller value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Age of the relationship (log)
Age of the 0.675*** 0.561*** 0.818*** 0.617*** 0.579*** 0.542*** 1.250*** 0.746**
 relationship (0.105) (0.095) (0.147) (0.102) (0.160) (0.092) (0.393) (0.224)
Adjusted R2 0.779 0.824 0.760 0.854 0.600 0.739 0.669 0.654
Panel B. Age of the relationship (level)
Age of the 0.198*** 0.239*** 0.163** 0.388***
 relationship (0.052) (0.071) (0.070) (0.117)
Adjusted R2 0.741 0.708 0.562 0.660
Seller and buyer  
 fixed effects
Yes — Yes — Yes — Yes —
Relationship fixed 
 effects
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Season fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 156 430 156 430 156 430 111 430
Notes: The table reports correlations between the relationship outcomes and the age of the relationship. The pure 
limited enforcement model predicts zero correlation between relationship outcomes and age of the relationship 
while the learning model predicts positive correlation (Test 2). Age of the relationship is measured as the number 
of previous shipment in the relationship. In panel A the age is in logs and in panel B it is in levels (hundreds of past 
transactions). The outcomes are computed for all seasons before the violence and the sample refers to relationships 
that were active during the period. The sample excludes relationships that are in the baseline sample but were not 
active in the season preceding the violence and includes relationships that did not survive until the violence sea-
son. Following business practices in the industry, a season starts in mid-August. The three considered seasons are 
those starting in August 2004, 2005, and 2006. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parenthesis.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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of calendar time and, therefore, allows us to include season fixed effects. The even 
columns in Table 4 (panel A only), report results from the following specification:
(12)   log ( y ˆit ) =  μ i +  ϕ t + β log (AG E it ) +  ε it , 
where  μ i are relationship fixed effects,  ϕ t season fixed effects, and  ε it is an error 
term. The selection effect documented in Figure 7 could induce a spurious positive 
correlation. The specification is therefore estimated on a balanced sample of rela-
tionships that were active in all three seasons prior to the violence.
Before presenting regression results, Figure 8 presents the data. The figure illus-
trates non-parametrically the association between the (log) value and age of the 
relationship in the cross-sectional sample (left panel) and in the balanced panel 
sample (right panel). In both cases, Figure 8 shows a strong positive association 
reasonably well approximated by an increasing and concave function. Results in 
Table 4 confirm a positive correlation between all relationship outcomes and age. 
Columns 1 and 2 report results for the quantity traded when the incentive constraint 
binds,  q i,t ω it ∗ R  . Columns 3 and 4 focus on the main outcome variable, the relation-
ship’s value  S ˆ it . To understand how parties split the relationship’s value over time, 
columns 5 and 6 consider the value of the relationship for the buyer and columns 7 
and 8 for the seller. Regardless of whether cross-sectional or time variation is used, 
the age of the relationship positively correlates with all relationship’s outcomes. 
Parties split the higher value of the relationship over time.
Table 5 explores the robustness of these results focusing on the two main out-
comes of interest,  q i,t ω it ∗ R and  S ˆ it . The positive correlation between relationship age 
and outcomes could be driven by changes in seasonality patterns. Columns 1 and 
5 control for seasonality effects and find results to be robust. Results could also be 
sensitive to the choice of the length of the period to compute deviations. Columns 2 
and 6 construct the outcome variables assuming a two week long deviation period 
Figure 8. Value of Relationships and Number of Past Transactions
Notes: The figure illustrates non-parametrically the association between the (log) value and age of the relationship. 
The left panel depicts the raw observations in the cross-sectional specification used in column 3, Table 4. The right 
panel depicts the raw observations for the balanced panel specification in column 4, Table 4. For data sources, please 
refer to the online Appendix.
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and confirm the findings. The number of previous shipments confounds frequency 
of shipment and age of the relationship measured in calendar time. Columns 3 and 
7 measure age as (the log of) the calendar time elapsed between the first shipment 
observed in the data and the time of the highest temptation to deviate in a given 
season. Again, results are robust. Finally, relationship outcomes might mechanically 
increase with time, as the highest auction price ever experienced by a relationship 
mechanically increases with time. Columns 4 and 8 control for the highest auction 
price ever experienced by the relationship and still find results to be robust.28
D. Test 3: Reputational Forces at the Time of the Violence
Reliability at the Time of the Violence.—The evidence in Tables 4 and 5 rejects 
the pure limited enforcement model and supports the predictions of the model with 
learning. Additional evidence shows that the aggregate incentive constraint (5) is 
binding for all relationships in the sample, from youngest to oldest. The evidence is 
28 Results are robust to a variety of different assumptions and specifications. In particular: (i) outcomes can 
be measured in levels, instead of logs; (ii) relationships for which estimated  V ˆ it are negative can also be included 
(assigning them a value of zero); and (iii) we do not find evidence of any difference between relationships in the 
conflict and no-conflict regions. 
Table 5—Age of the Relationships and Outcomes (Test 2): Robustness Checks 
Trade volume Relationship value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age of the relationship 0.628*** 0.654*** 0.837*** 0.485*** 0.619*** 0.685*** 0.848*** 0.544***
(0.073) (0.108) (0.292) (0.118) (0.082) (0.110) (0.267) (0.120)
Relationship fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seasonality fixed effects Yes No No No Yes No No No
Two weeks deviation No Yes No No No Yes No No
 window
Alternative age measure No No Yes No No No Yes No
Max. auction price No No No Yes No No No Yes
 experienced
Adjusted R2 0.852 0.865 0.814 0.835 0.868 0.877 0.839 0.869
Observations 430 430 424 372 430 430 424 372
Notes: The table reports correlations between the relationship outcomes and the age of the relationship. The pure 
limited enforcement model predicts zero correlation between relationship outcomes and age of the relationship 
while the learning model predicts positive correlation (Test 2). Age of the relationship is measured as the num-
ber of previous shipment in the relationship. All variables are in logs. The outcomes are computed for all seasons 
before the violence and the sample refers to relationships that were active during the period. The sample excludes 
relationships that are in the baseline sample but were not active in the season preceding the violence and includes 
relationships that did not survive until the violence season. Following business practices in the industry, a season 
starts in mid-August. The three considered seasons are those starting in August 2004, 2005, and 2006. Seasonality 
fixed effects are dummies for the week of the season in which the maximum aggregate temptation to deviate occurs. 
Columns 2 and 6 compute relationship outcomes using two weeks deviations period. Columns 3 and 7 measure age 
as the (log of the) number of days since the first shipment in the relationship. Columns 4 and 8 control for the high-
est auction price ever experience by the relationship. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level are reported 
in parenthesis.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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consistent with relationships converging to a constrained volume of trade as learn-
ing about the seller’s type unfolds. The positive correlation between relationship’s 
age and outcomes, however, could be driven by factors other than learning about 
the seller’s type. This section provides further empirical tests of the model with 
learning by examining how relationships reacted to the violence. In particular, the 
model with learning about the seller’s type predicts that the delivery of roses during 
the violence is an inverted-U shaped function of the age of the relationship (Test 3).
We begin by constructing a measure of reliability at the time of the violence. For 
simplicity, we measure reliability as the ratio between actual shipments volumes 
during the week of the violence divided by the average volume shipped in the rela-
tionship during the control period, i.e., the first 20 weeks of the season.29 Denote by 
y sb the observed shipments of roses in the relationship between seller  s and buyer  b 
during the week of the violence, and by  y sb 0 the average weekly shipment of roses 
in the same relationship during the control period. Reliability at the time of the vio-
lence is given by
(13)   ˆ sb =   y sb  ___ y sb 0 
 . 
The first two columns in Table 6 show that the violence reduced reliability   ˆ sb . 
The first column in Table 6 simply compares reliability of relationships across the 
two regions. Reliability was approximately 17 percent lower in relationships in 
the conflict region. The second column in Table 6 includes additional controls. 
Specifically, column 2 reports results from the regression
(14)   ˆ sb =  α b + β ( I s C=1 ) + γ Z sb + η X s +  ε sb ,  
in which  I s C=1 is an indicator function that takes value equal to one if seller  s is 
located in the region affected by the violence and zero otherwise;  Z sb is a vector of 
relationship controls,  X s is a vector of seller controls, and  α b are buyer fixed effects. 
Relationship controls are average price and volumes during the control period. Seller 
controls are size (in hectares of land under greenhouses), fair trade certification, age 
of the firm, membership in main business association and ownership dummies (for-
eign, domestic Indian, indigenous Kenyan). Note that the reliability measure   ˆ sb 
is a deviation from a relationships-specific counterfactual. The controls included in 
specification (14), then, allow the violence period to have affected export volumes 
in a particular relationship differentially across buyers, sellers, and relationship 
characteristics.30 Column 2 confirms that the violence reduced reliability.
29 In earlier versions, we exploited the regularity of shipments within relationships to construct a counterfactual 
measure of the volumes of roses that should have been delivered in a particular relationship had the violence not 
occurred. We separately estimated for each relationship a model predicting shipments of roses in a particular day 
based on previous week shipments, seasonality, and day of the week fixed effects. Results are virtually identical. 
30 The results from specification (14), therefore, are equivalent to those of a regression of volumes of exports  y ̃sbωt 
in week  ω of season  t, on relationship-specific seasonality and season fixed effects,  μ sbω and  μ sbt , in which the effects 
of the violence are recovered from an interaction between a dummy for the period of the violence,  v ωt , and a dummy 
for the conflict region,  c s , after controlling for the interaction between  v ωt with seller and relationship characteristics 
and buyer fixed effects. 
2938 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEpTEMbER 2015
Reliability and Relationship’s Age.—We now turn to Test 3: the predicted 
non-monotonic relationship between the age of the relationship and reliabil-
ity. Recall the model points at two distinct mechanisms. The positive correlation 
between relationship age and value for the seller (empirically confirmed in columns 
7 and 8 in Table 4) implies that sellers in older relationships have stronger incentives 
to exert effort during the violence and deliver roses to the buyers. At the same time, 
in very old relationships, little uncertainty is left regarding the seller’s type. Low 
reliability, then, would not lead to overly pessimistic beliefs about the seller’s type 
and to termination of the relationship. The model with learning about the seller’s 
type, therefore, predicts an inverted-U relationship between reliability and relation-
ship’s age (Test 3).
Figure 9 illustrates the non-parametric relationship between reliability and rela-
tionship’s age for the two separate samples of relationships in the conflict and in 
the no-conflict region. The figure shows an inverted-U shaped relationship between 
reliability and relationship’s age in the conflict region. In contrast, there is no rela-
tionship in the no-conflict region. The figure, therefore, lends strong support to 
the predictions of the model. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 explore the relationship 
between reliability   ˆ sb and relationship’s age more formally for the conflict and 
no-conflict regions separately. For each separate region, columns 3 and 4 estimate 
the following specification:
(15)   ˆ sb =  α b +  μ s +  β 1 (AG E sb ) +  β 2 (AG E sb ) 2 + γ Z sb +  ε sb ,
Table 6—Reliability at the Time of the Violence (Test 3)
Dependent variable: reliability during violence
Firms in  Firms in  
All firms All firms no-conflict regions  conflict regions
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict region −0.174*** −0.200* — —
(0.031) (0.115)
Age of the relationship −0.010 0.200**
(0.040) (0.104)
Age of the relationship (sqrd) 0.0001 −0.020***
(0.004) (0.009)
Relationship controls No Yes Yes Yes
Seller controls No Yes — —
Buyer fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Seller fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.027 0.100 0.396
Observations 189 189 189 189
Notes: The table reports differences in estimated reliability between direct relationships of firms located in regions 
directly affected by the violence against firms located in regions not directly affected. The learning model predicts 
an inverted-U shape relationship between reliability and age of the relationship (Test 3). Reliability is computed as 
the ratio between actual shipments volumes during the week of the violence divided by the average volume shipped 
in the relationship during the control period, i.e., the first 20 weeks of the season. Age of the relationship is mea-
sured as the number of previous shipments in the relationship (in hundreds of transactions). Robust standard errors, 
two-way clustered at the seller and buyer levels, are reported in parenthesis.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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where, as before,  α b are buyer fixed effects and  Z sb are relationship controls. The 
specification in (15) is very similar to the one in (14), but note that it now includes 
seller fixed effects  μ s . It is now possible to include seller fixed effects since we 
are interested in comparing relationships within firms. The age of the relationship 
 AG E sb is as before measured by the number of previous transactions (in hundreds) 
and is now included in levels rather than in logs to allow for a more transparent 
interpretation of the nonlinear pattern.31
The results confirm the findings in Figure 9: there is an inverted-U relationship 
between reliability and relationship’s age in the conflict (column 3) but not in the 
no-conflict (column 4) region. To help with the interpretation of the results, note 
that the estimated coefficients imply that reliability at the time of the violence 
negatively correlates with relationship’s age for relationships with age greater 
than  − β ˆ 1  /2 β ˆ 2 ≃ 0.2/(2 × 0.02) = 5. In the sample, this corresponds to approxi-
mately one quarter of relationships in the conflict region.32
E. Effort at the Time of the Violence: Direct Evidence
The evidence supports the predictions of the limited enforcement model with 
learning about the seller’s type. The model predictions rest on the assumption that 
firms in the conflict region could have exerted costly and unobservable effort to 
31 Results are qualitatively unchanged if the log specification is used. 
32 Additional results are consistent with the logic of a model with learning about the seller’s type. Since reliabil-
ity is informative about the seller’s type, the model also predicts that reliability correlates with subsequent outcomes 
in the relationships. We find that (i) more relationships did not survive to the following season in the conflict region 
(16 out of 94, i.e., 17 percent) than in the no-conflict region (8 out of 95, i.e., 8.5 percent); (ii) reliability positively 
correlates with relationships’ survival in the conflict region but not in the no-conflict region; and (iii) in the conflict 
region reliability correlates with better outcomes in the subsequent season, but less so for older relationships. 
Figure 9. Reliability and Conflict in Direct Relationships
Notes: The figure illustrates non-parametrically the association between reliability and the relationships age for the 
two separate samples of relationships in the conflict and no-conflict region. The figure depicts an inverted-U shaped 
association between reliability and relationships in the conflict region. In contrast, there is no such association in 
the no-conflict region. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 500 1,000 1,500
Number of past transactions
Reliability in conict area Lowess
Reliability in no-conict area Lowess
2940 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEpTEMbER 2015
 protect deliveries to direct buyers. We conclude the empirical section providing 
direct evidence that firms exerted effort during the violence, as assumed in the 
model. Two margins of effort are considered: (i) reducing sales to the auctions, 
which was costly due to high prices paid on the spot market during the violence, and 
(ii) effort to keep workers coming at the farm to harvest during the violence.
Figure 10 shows that, at the time of the violence, prices in most direct rela-
tionships were lower than prices on the spot market. Table 7 shows that, despite 
higher prices at the auctions, export volumes to the auctions dropped significantly 
more than export volumes to direct buyers in the region affected by the violence. 
Column 1 extends the analysis of reliability in specification (14) to also include 
sales to the auctions.33 Sales to the auctions were about 50 percent lower than nor-
mal times for firms in the conflict region. The drop in sales to the auctions for these 
firms was significantly larger than the drop in sales to direct relationships, which 
was only about 16 percent. No pattern is observed for firms in the no conflict region. 
Column 2 repeats the exercise controlling for seller fixed effects, i.e., comparing 
sales to the two channels within the same firm. The results are robust. Seller in the 
conflict region gave up profits from delivering to the auctions at higher prices to 
protect their direct relationships.
The remaining two columns of Table 7 focus on a second effort dimension: worker 
retention. Firms located in regions affected by the violence reported an average of 
50 percent of their labor force missing during the period of the violence. Firms could 
try to retain workers and limit disruptions in harvesting by setting up camps on or 
33 Reliability at the auctions is computed as reliability in direct relationships. 
Figure 10. Prices at Auctions versus Direct Relationships 
Notes: The figure displays the distribution of average FOB price per stem in direct relationships at the time of the 
violence. The two vertical lines show the average prices of small and large stems of roses at the Dutch auctions at the 
time of the violence (the left most is the average auction price for small roses and the right most is for large roses). 
The figure illustrates that most relationships paid prices lower than at the spot market during violence. Further 
FOB prices in direct relationships in the conflict region were not renegotiated during the time of violence. The fig-
ure shows the distribution of average FOB prices per stem in direct relationships at the time of the violence and in 
the control period, i.e., the ten weeks prior to the violence. For data sources, please refer to the online Appendix.
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around the farm for workers threatened by the violence. Focusing on the conflict 
region alone, column 3 finds that firms that only sold to direct buyers in the period 
before the violence retained a higher percentage of workers than firms that special-
ized in selling to the auctions (not statistically significant). Column 4 shows that the 
correlation is statistically significant after controlling for characteristics of the firm’s 
labor force (gender, ethnicity, contract type, and housing programs), firm character-
istics (ownership type, certifications, and land size) and exposure to the violence, 
as proxied by location fixed effects. The evidence is consistent with firms trying to 
retain workers to guarantee deliveries to their direct buyers.
IV. Discussion
The evidence strongly supports the model with limited enforcement and learning 
about the seller’s type: (i) due to limited enforcement, the volume of trade is con-
strained by the value of the relationship (Test 1); (ii) the value of the relationship 
increases with age (Test 2); and (iii) deliveries at the time of the violence are an 
inverted-U shaped function of the age of the relationship (Test 3), as predicted by 
Table 7—Effort at the Time of Violence: Direct Evidence
Reliability during violence Percent workers lost
Dependent variable Relationships Seller
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict region −0.595*** — — —
(0.112)
Direct relationship −0.022 −0.043
(0.058) (0.105)
Direct relationship × conflict region 0.421*** 0.479**
(0.117) (0.194)
Seller only sells to the auctions 16.783 40.157***
(13.678) (12.718)
Seller sells to both marketing channels 12.067 7.978
(13.748) (10.315)
Seller fixed effects No Yes — —
Location fixed effects No — Yes Yes
Seller controls No No Yes Yes
Only sellers in conflict region No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.331 0.039 0.594
Observations 262 262 42 42
Notes: The table reports direct evidence that firms exerted effort to maintain deliveries to direct buyers. Column 1 
expands the specification in column 2 of Table 6 including sales to the auctions during the violence. Reliability at 
the auctions is computed as reliability in direct relationships in Table 6. Firms in the conflict region had significantly 
lower exports than usual. The column documents a differential effect across the two marketing channels, with sig-
nificantly lower export reductions to direct relationships. Column 2 includes seller fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the seller level, are reported in parenthesis in columns 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 report results 
at the seller level focusing on the sample of interviewed sellers located in the conflict region. Correlations between 
the percentage of workers reported missing during the violence and the marketing channels used by the firm are 
reported. Workers lost (percent) is the highest percentage reported by the firm throughout the period during and 
following the eruption of violence. These results also appear in Ksoll, Macchiavello, and Morjaria (2013). Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the location level, are reported in parenthesis.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the model. Before concluding, this section discusses the role of unobserved rose 
characteristics, some key assumptions in our model, and how the evidence relates to 
alternative theoretical models.
A. Unobserved Rose Characteristics
The value of a rose mainly depends on (i) its size, which we proxy with unit 
weights reported in the customs data, and (ii) its variety which, unfortunately, is 
not reported. Unobserved rose characteristics present two main concerns for our 
results. A first concern regards the seller’s incentive constraint (3) and its empirical 
implementation in (10). To estimate the lower bound to the value of the relationship 
we assumed that the roses can be sold at the auctions. A violation of the assumption 
introduces measurement error. The auctions are an extremely liquid market in which 
hundreds of rose varieties are traded each day. Conversations with practitioners sug-
gest that the assumption is likely to be valid in most cases. Still, it is possible that 
for some relationships the assumption is violated. Three aspects of the empirical 
results are reassuring regarding the importance of this source of measurement error. 
First, Table A2 in online Appendix D shows that, within firms, there is no difference 
in the average and standard deviation of unit weights sold to direct buyers and to 
the auctions. Second, the predictions of the model hold for two outcome variables, 
quantities, and value of the relationship for the buyer, that do not directly depend 
on prices at the auctions. Third, the evidence of a binding incentive constraint (5) 
in Table 2 suggests that side-selling to the auction is the relevant deviation in most 
relationships.
A second concern is that firms might export to different buyers varieties of roses 
that are differentially affected by the violence (e.g., more labor intensive or perish-
able varieties). If those rose characteristics correlate with the age of the relationship, 
the results in Table 6 might be biased. Online Appendix Table A2 shows that average 
and standard deviation of unit weights do not correlate with the age of the relation-
ship. Further (unreported) results show that average and standard deviation of unit 
weights do not change with season and at the time of the violence within relation-
ships. To the extent that data allows, we do not find evidence that unobserved rose 
characteristics pose a threat to the results.
B. Assumptions in the Model
We assumed that prices are constant within seasons. The complexity associated 
with indexing contracts on weekly auction prices, the inability of sellers and courts 
to observe the quality of roses delivered and a desire to smooth seasonality in income 
profiles are likely forces behind the use of constant prices. We abstract from these 
forces and take constant prices as a fact of commercial life in our environment. The 
qualitative insights of the model are robust to allowing prices to change across seasons.
A second assumption is that outside options do not change over time. The assump-
tion is justified by the fact that outside options are likely to be functions of seller’s 
specific, rather than relationship’s specific, variables that evolve over time. The 
empirical analysis controls for seller’s fixed effects, effectively comparing relation-
ships holding constant seller’s specific factors that could determine outside options.
2943Macchiavello and Morjaria: The value of relaTionshipsvol. 105 no. 9
We have assumed that the violence was an unforeseen event and a corresponding 
plan of action was not specified in the original relational contract. This assumption 
simplifies the analysis and is in line with interviews in the field. We conjecture that a 
model in which the relational contract specifies a plan of action for the violence and 
the likelihood of violence tends to zero would generate qualitatively similar results.
C. Informal Insurance
Insurance considerations could also be important determinants of the value of 
relationships in this context.34 Informal insurance models also predict  non-stationary 
outcomes: past realizations of shocks influence future continuation values. Because 
past realization of shocks are unobservable it is difficult to reject informal insurance 
models. The results, however, suggest that insurance considerations are unlikely to 
be driving how relationships reacted to the violence. First, insurance models predict 
that relationships with higher promised value should give more slack to the seller. 
The evidence suggests the opposite is true: older, and more valuable, relationships 
tend to have higher reliability. Second, insurance considerations imply the use of 
both current transfers and future values to provide incentives. In contrast, the dis-
tribution of prices at the time of the violence is very similar to its counterpart in the 
20 weeks before the violence. Prices were not renegotiated upward at the time of 
the violence (see Figure 10). The lack of price renegotiation is, however, consistent 
with the model. The binding incentive constraint (5) implies that during the violence 
buyers could not promise higher prices in case of delivery.
D. Alternative Modeling Assumptions
Levin (2003) extended the relational contracts literature (see, e.g., MacLeod and 
Malcomson 1989; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1994; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 
2002) to the case of moral hazard and adverse selection with i.i.d. types over time. 
Under both scenarios, provided that (i) parties are risk-neutral and have access to 
monetary transfers, and (ii) the buyer’s actions are perfectly observable; the con-
strained optimal relational contract is stationary. The evidence, therefore, rejects 
extensions of the model entirely based on this type of asymmetric information.
Other modeling assumptions, however, imply non-stationary outcomes without 
assuming learning. When there is moral hazard and the buyer privately observes 
the quality of the roses delivered stationary contracts are no longer optimal. 
Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007), however, show that the optimal contract is a ter-
mination contract in which trade between parties continues in a stationary fashion 
provided performance is above a certain threshold during a certain period of time. If 
performance falls below the threshold, the relationship ends. The evidence is, there-
fore, also inconsistent with this extension of the model.
We have introduced learning about the seller’s type assuming symmetric infor-
mation between the buyer and the seller (as in, e.g., Holmström 1999). This allows 
us to focus on the empirical implications of learning. Halac (2012) and Yang (2013) 
34 While seasonal fluctuations in market prices are predictable, buyers and sellers might be subject to idiosyn-
cratic demand and supply shocks. 
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study relational contract models with asymmetric information over types and obtain 
non-stationary outcomes.35
V. Conclusion
Imperfect contract enforcement is a pervasive feature of real-life commercial 
transactions. In the absence of formal contract enforcement, trading parties rely on 
the future rents associated with long-term relationships to deter short-term oppor-
tunism and facilitate trade. Empirical evidence on the structure of informal arrange-
ments in supply relationships between firms has the potential to identify salient 
microeconomic frictions in specific contexts and inform policy, particularly in a 
development context. This paper presents an empirical study of supply relationships 
in the Kenyan rose export sector, a context particularly well-suited to study informal 
relationships between firms.
We find evidence consistent with models in which sellers value acquiring and 
maintaining a reputation for reliability. From a policy perspective, it is important to 
know whether learning and reputation are important determinants of firms’ success 
in export markets. Firms might have to operate at initial losses in order to acquire 
a good reputation. Furthermore, if reputation is an important determinant of con-
tractual outcomes, prior beliefs about sellers affect buyers willingness to trade, at 
least for a while. This generates externalities across sellers and over time, justifying 
commonly observed institutions such as certifications, business associations, and 
subsidies to joint marketing activities.
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